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11 Introduction
In this paper, we propose a model based on location, wages and beliefs to ex-
plain why, after controlling for human capital diﬀerences, criminality is higher
among blacks and even higher when they reside in ghettos. The aim of this
paper is thus to show that both location and beliefs matter for explaining the
high crime rate among blacks in cities.
It is well documented that blacks are on average more criminals than whites,
even after controlling for the usual determinants of crime such as education.
For example, in the U.S., the proportion of black men 20 to 29 years old
directly in trouble with the law (in jail or prison or on probation or parole)
reached 23 percent in 1989 (Case and Katz, 1991). Freeman (1994) shows that,
in 1993, the number incarcerated was 1.9 percent of the male work force, but
among blacks, the number incarcerated was 8.8 percent of the work force and
25.3 percent under supervision relative to the work force. For black men aged
18-34, the ratios to the work force were 12.7 percent incarcerated and 36.7
percent under supervision.
It is also well documented that, within cities, crime is highly concentrated
in a limited number of areas. For instance, in U.S. metropolitan areas, after
controlling for education, crime rates are much higher in central cities than
in suburbs. Between 1985 and 1992, crime victimizations averaged 0.409 per
household in central cities, while they averaged 0.306 per household in suburbs
(Bearse, 1996, Figure 1).1 More generally, U.S. central cities have higher crime
and unemployment rates, higher population densities and larger relative black
populations than their corresponding suburban rings (South and Crowder,
1997, Table 2).
Thus, even after controlling for human capital (education) and other idio-
syncratic characteristics (such as age for example), one still observes that crime
r a t e sa r eh i g h e rf o rb l a c k st h a nf o rw h i t es and that they are unevenly distrib-
uted within cities (see for example Freeman, 1999). Social interaction models,
stating that individual behavior depends not only on individual incentives but
also on the behavior of peers and neighbors, are a natural way of explaining
the concentration of crime by area. An individual is more likely to commit
crime if his/her peers commit crime than if they do not (Glaeser, Sacerdote
1Grogger and Willis (2000, Table 2) also show that central cities are more crime-ridden
than suburbs for most crimes. For instance, the mean murder rate in central cities is ﬁve
times greater than that in the suburbs and for property crimes they diﬀer by a factor of two
or three.
2and Scheinkman, 1996).2
W ea d o p th e r ead i ﬀerent route by focusing on beliefs and location. The
belief-based equilibrium idea and the self-fulﬁlling prophecy in which negative
beliefs about an identiﬁed group lead to a bad outcome for this group has been
extensively used in models of statistical discrimination (see e.g. Acemoglu,
1995, Coate and Loury, 1993, Framer and Terell, 1996, Moro and Norman,
2003, Piketty, 1998). The mechanics of our model that generates diﬀerential
outcomes for blacks and whites is very close to the one used in these models.
W h a ti sn e wh e r ei st h ei n t e r p r e t a t i o no ft h ev a r i o u sv a r i a b l e sa n dt h er o l e
of location. In particular, if the primitives of the economy are such that our
model possesses a unique equilibrium, then without location (or more generally
space), one cannot generate multiple equilibria.
Let us be more precise about this mechanism. Our model ties locational
segregation, crime and racial inequality in a uniﬁed framework. The key fea-
ture is that each piece of the puzzle could be explained on its own but, by
constraining ourselves to use a parametric speciﬁcation, we show that they
can only stand together. For example, one could easily write a “statistical
discrimination” model of crime without location but this would not, in our
model, generate a “discriminatory” equilibrium without location. One could
also write a location model without racial inequality, such that criminals lo-
cate far away from jobs but this would not explain why crime is not symmetric
across races. What is interesting here is that (under some parametric as-
sumptions), it is only when one combines the two pieces that an asymmetric
equilibrium is possible.
Let us now describe our model. Blacks and whites are ex ante identical.
They all have the same distribution of aversion to crime u, which is assumed
to be uniformly distributed. There is (statistical) discrimination in the labor
market since ﬁrms pay to each worker the average productivity of his/her
group. Assuming that (non-convicted) crime hurts productivity, then groups
with higher crime rates receive lower wages. We also assume that workers
residing further away are less productive (more tired) than those living closer
to jobs. If all workers believe that blacks are more criminal than whites,
then blacks will segregate themselves from whites because their ability to pay
for land will be lower due to anticipated lower wages (labor discrimination).
Since blacks are segregated and live further away from jobs, the wage gap
between blacks and whites is even larger because of spatial discrimination. As a
2For an overview on the spatial aspects of crime, see Zenou (2003).
3result, blacks become more criminal than whites because of lower labor market
opportunities. The loop is closed and beliefs are self-fulﬁlling. It is therefore
our contention that, after controlling for human capital diﬀerences, location
and beliefs play a major role in explaining the enormous over-representation
of blacks in criminal activities.
2T h e m o d e l
There are two types of individuals, blacks (B)a n dw h i t e s( W), who only diﬀer
by the color of their skin. In other words, the two types are diﬀerentiated
only by a characteristic i ∈ {B,W} that is publicly observable by all agents
(workers and ﬁrms) in the economy. This characteristic is totally unrelated to
any fundamental parameter of the economy. For simplicity, we normalize the
size of each population to 1. Workers of both types {B,W} are heterogeneous
in their incentives to commit crime so that they have diﬀerent aversion to crime
u (or alternatively crime productivity). Regardless of location and type, we
assume that this parameter u is independently identically distributed (i.i.d.)
across individuals according to a uniform distribution F(u)=u on the interval
[0,1].
All agents, workers and ﬁrms, are assumed to be risk neutral. The city,
in which both ﬁrms and workers are located, is monocentric, i.e., all ﬁrms are
exogenously located in the Business District (BD hereafter), linear, closed and
all land is owned by absentee landlords.3 T h eB Di st h ep l a c ew h e r ea l lﬁrms
are located. Observe that our model can capture the case of both US and
European cities depending on the location of the BD (in the city-center or in
the suburbs). However, as it will become clear below, what really matters here
is the distance to jobs.
There is a continuum of workers (blacks or whites) uniformly distributed
along the linear city who endogenously decide their optimal residence between
the BD and the city fringe. They all consume the same amount of land (nor-
malized to 1 for simplicity) and the density of residential land parcels is taken
to be unity so that there are exactly x units of housing within a distance x
of the BD. Workers go to the BD to work (commuting costs) and thus bear a
total cost tx at a distance x from the BD (where t is the commuting cost per
3We assume for simplicity throughout that land is a perfect substitute for housing, so
that both are equivalent. This can be relaxed by adding a housing sector as for example in
Muth (1969). This will complicate the analysis but not alter our main results.
4unit of distance).
The timing of the model is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, all individuals
choose their location in the city without knowing their type u but anticipating
(with rational expectations) the average total population of criminals of type
i = B,W. In the second stage, types (or honesty parameters) are revealed
and individuals decide to commit crime or not. The assumption that types
are revealed only after location choices has been made to take into account the
relative inertia of the land market compared to the crime and labor markets.
Obviously, individuals make quicker decisions in terms of crime or labor than in
terms of residential location. As we will see below (see the end of section 3.1),
this assumption is made to simplify the analysis and relaxing it do not alter
the main results of this paper. In stage 3, honest and non-convicted workers
participate in the labor market and, in stage 4, consume the composite good.
Observe that in the second stage, workers are stuck to their initial locations
(decided in the ﬁrst stage) and cannot relocate themselves. They then decide
to become criminal or not by taking into account the fact that, the further
away they reside from jobs, the higher is the opportunity cost of being far
away from legal activities. Since there is full employment, what matters is the
net wage, i.e. the wage net of commuting costs.
In our model, criminality is unobserved by employers (unless individuals
are caught and convicted) so that employers must decide how much to pay
the convicted as well as the unconvicted workers. When a worker engages in
crime, regardless of his/her type, he/she can be caught and convicted with
some exogenous probability α ∈]0,1[. T h ed i r e c tr e w a r df r o mc r i m ei sΠ and
the public penalty, when convicted, is P. On top of that he/she is sent to
prison and therefore cannot participate to the labor market. We denote by
θi(x) the proportion of individuals of type i = B,W at distance x from the
center who commit crime and by θi, the average total population of criminals
of type i = B,W. Since there is a continuum of workers, this variable is
unaﬀected by any individual’s decision.
We are now able to describe the diﬀerent markets at work, namely labor,
crime and land markets.
2.1 The labor market
The type of crime we have in mind is the following. Individuals are working
during the day and are drug dealers during their spare time (evenings and
week-ends).
5Employers compete with each other for workers but ﬁrms can only observe
the total fraction of convictions for both types i of individuals and the location
x of each worker, and do not observe neither criminality nor marginal product.
The two following assumptions about the production function are crucial here.
First, we assume that crime aﬀects net productivity so that non-convicted
criminals are less productive than non-criminal workers. One way of justifying
this assumption is to put forward the morale issue. People committing crime
(drug dealers) are more incline to be dishonest at their workplace (think for
example of employee theft) and more likely to overcome the fear and pangs of
conscience of a ﬁrst oﬀense. In other words, someone with a history of crime
is less reluctant to steal than someone who has never committed a crime (see
e.g. Dickens et al., 1989, Rasmusen, 1996, and Freeman, 1999).4 Another way
of justifying this assumption is to consider that crime activities have negative
externalities on the production process. Indeed, because of parallel violent
illegal activities, a criminal, especially a drug dealer, has a higher probability
to be physically injured, or even killed. If he/she is killed, then the ﬁrm will
support turnover costs to replace the worker. If the worker is injured, he/she
will obviously not be very eﬃcient when working. Furthermore, drug dealers
consume themselves drugs and alcohol and have thus a reduced productivity.
Fagan and Freeman (1997) review a number of studies that ﬁnd that even
experienced drug dealers hold legal jobs, possibly to tide themselves over during
period when the drug business is especially dangerous.
Second, we also assume that distance to jobs is harmful to productivity.
This assumption captures the fact that workers who have longer commuting
trips are more tired and are thus less able to provide higher levels of eﬀort
(or productivity) than those who reside closer to jobs. This implies that com-
muting costs include more than just money and time costs. It also includes
these negative eﬀects of a longer commute such as non-work-related fatigue.5
4Employee thefts is quite common in companies. For example, according to Arnold
(1985), employee theft is believed to transfer between $15 and $56 billion per year from
businesses to their workers and to account for between 5% and 30% of business failures each
year. Similar ﬁgures are obtained by Lipman and McGraw (1988) and Shepard and Duston
(1988).
5Distance to jobs could be very painful in large U.S. Metroplitan Statistical Areas because
of the lack of good public transportation (see e.g. Pugh, 1998). For instance, the New York
Times of May 26, 1998, was telling the story of Dorothy Johnson, a Detroit inner-city black
female resident who had to commute to an evening job as a cleaning lady in a suburban
oﬃce. By using public transportation, it took her two hours whereas, if she could aﬀord a
car, the commute would have taken only 25 minutes.
6Moreover, this assumption can also capture the fact that workers who reside
further away from jobs have less ﬂexible working hours. For example, in some
jobs (e.g. working in a restaurant), there are long breaks during the day (typi-
cally between 2 pm and 6 pm in restaurants). The worker who lives next door
can go back home and relax whereas the others, who live far away, cannot rest
home. This obviously also aﬀects workers’ productivity.
Let us now investigate the implications of these two assumptions on the
wage setting. The latter is aﬀected by: Labor discrimination (statistical dis-
crimination) which implies that the oﬀered wage is type speciﬁc and negatively
depends on θi, the average total population of criminals of type i = B,W;
Workers’ location since productivity (or eﬀort) is inversely related to distance
to jobs. Therefore, assuming that an honest or non convicted worker oﬀers
inelastically 1 unit of labor, in its more general form the wage is as follows:







In order to have a tractable model, let us be more speciﬁca b o u tt h ew a g e
formation (this does not change any of our results). Our two assumptions
above are captured by the fact that the productivity of an honest worker
residing in x is m − βx + y with y>0 while that of a non convicted criminal
residing in x is m − βx. In this context, since employers compete with each
other for workers (perfect competition) and only observe the total fraction αθi
of convictions and the location of each worker, the oﬀered wage on the market
wi is type’s i speciﬁc and will be equal to the average productivity of that
worker. The probability that a worker of type i is honest is (1−θi)/(1−αθi),
and the probability that a worker of type i is a non-convicted criminal is


















As expected, the wage rate of an individual of type i depends positively
on m and y, the productivity parameters and negatively on x t h ed i s t a n c et o
jobs. An increase in the average crime rate θi (as perceived by all agents)
reduces wi since the probability to face a ‘low productive’ criminal is increased
for each employer. Finally, the probability of conviction α has a positive eﬀect
on wages. Indeed, when more criminals are on average convicted, the quality
7of the labor market pools increases from the ﬁrm’s viewpoint. This, in turn,
pushes up the wage rate paid to these workers.
2.2 Crime
Even though jobs, ﬁrms and workers have a location in the city, crime is
assumed not to be localized. This means for example that people commit
crimes outside of the city. In the case of drug dealers, it implies that criminals
sell drugs to people outside the city. In this context, a worker of type (i,x,u),
i.e. a worker of type i = B,W located at a distance x from the BD with crime
aversion u ∈ [0,1], must decide to be a criminal or not. The expected payoﬀ
of a criminal is given by:
V
C
i (x,u)=α(Π − P)+( 1− α)(Π + wi − tx) − R(x) − u (2)
where R(x) is the equilibrium land rent at a distance x from the BD. In this
formulation, non-convicted criminals participate in the labor market so that
they commit crimes while employed -doubling up their legal and illegal work
(Π + wi). Observe that the expected payoﬀ (2) negatively depends on θi the
average crime rate of population of type i = B,W since wages are reduced
when θi increases. Observe also that wi −tx is the net wage, i.e. the wage net
of commuting costs. In this context, if a worker is caught and put to prison,
he/she bears no commuting costs while still paying the land rent. We assume
however that, even in prison, individuals still pay the land rent because they
keep their housings.6 The expected payoﬀ of a non criminal is equal to:
V
NC
i (x,u)=wi − tx − R(x)
Therefore a worker of type (i,x,u) chooses to be criminal if and only if
V C
i (x,u) >VNC
i (x,u). So the value of u making an individual of type (i,x,u)
indiﬀerent between crime and non crime is e u(x,θi) and is given by:
e u(x,θi)=Π − αP − α(wi − tx) (3)





y + α(β + t)x
6We can easily relax this assumption and assume that, when criminals are caught, they
do not pay anymore the land rent. It should be clear that this will not change any of our
results since everything will be divided by an exogeneous parameter 1 − α.W e k e e p t h i s
assumption in order to simplify the algebra.
8Thus, θi(x,θi), the equilibrium crime rate of workers of type (i,x) is:
θi(x,θi)=θ(x,θi)=F
µ









In order to avoid dealing with the relatively uninteresting case in which all
workers of at least one group (black or white) are criminals, we constrain the
parameters to be such that:
Assumption H1: αy<Π − αP − αm<1 − 2α(β + t)
It can easily be checked that under assumption H1, the crime rate is always


























The following comments are in order. First, the incentives to commit crime
for a particular individual depends (among other things) on the location of that
individual in the city. More precisely, everything else being equal, people living
further away from the BD (legal activities) are more likely to become criminals.
The intuition run as follows. Workers who live further away from jobs have less
opportunities because of lower net wages and thus are more likely to become
criminal. The net wage is lower for two reasons: (i) remote workers are more
tired and produce less, (ii) at any given distance x,c r i m i n a l sp a yo na v e r a g e
smaller transportation costs than honest individuals. In this context, when
individuals reside far away from jobs, the incentives to become criminal are
higher than when they live closer to the BD because of lower labor market
opportunities.
A second interesting feature of (5) is the fact that the actual incentive to be
a criminal for an individual of type i = B,W,positively depends on the average
crime rate θi of individuals sharing the same type i in society. In other words,
there is a positive group externality on crime incentives despite the groups’
exogenous characteristics being identical. This is because this characteristic
7It is important to keep in mind that we are not in equilibrium so that to compute the
results of (5), we have held θi constant when varying any generic variable. This allows us
to give the basic intuitions of the model.
9plays a role in the process of labor market discrimination and the levels of
wages wi oﬀered on that market. The higher the perceived average crime rate
of individuals of type i as a group, the lower the wage rate wi they are oﬀered
by employers. This in turn, reduces their individual’s incentives to remain
honest and therefore positively aﬀect their actual crime rate.8
L a s t ,f r o m( 5 ) ,w eo b t a i nas t r a i g h t f o rward comparative statics analysis
on θi(x,θi). It is obviously increasing in the gains of crime Π,d e c r e a s i n gi n
the penalty level P (as for example in the seminal paper of Becker, 1968),
decreasing in productivity parameters (since they increase the opportunity cost
of crime). It is also increasing in the unit cost of transportation t. Indeed, when
individuals are further away from legal economic activities, the opportunity
cost to commit crime is reduced. Finally and interestingly, the impact of the
probability of conviction α on the crime rate is a priori ambiguous. First,
an increased probability of being arrested reduces the incentives to crime as
it increases the expected penalty αP and the expected opportunity cost to
work αwi. It also reduces crime by reducing labor market discrimination and
increasing the wage rate wi (this can be seen from (1)). On the other hand,
it reduces the expected costs of transportation to legal activities αtx, which
in itself makes crime more proﬁtable. Clearly, the closer the individual to the
BD, the weaker the last eﬀect, and the more likely, the negative impact of α on
crime. There is therefore a diﬀerence between enforcement α and punishment
P. In our setting, if P increases (for example by increasing the number of
years in prison for a given crime), then there are less criminals in the city. On
the other hand, if α rises (for example by increasing the number of policemen),
then, as shown above, the number of criminals can increase or decrease. In
fact, it can be shown that, for α < 1/2,t h ec r i m er a t eθi(x,θi) is increasing in
α for a large enough distance x to legal activities and a high enough expected
crime rate θi.
2.3 The land market
In order to analyze the land market, we can compute the expected utility of a
worker of type (i,x,u) before the revelation of u. This is because individuals
8This eﬀect, going through discrimination on the labor market, has been illustrated
by Rasmusen (1996) in a non spatial context. See also Sah (1991) for a learning crime
group externality not related to discrimination on the labor market, as well as other group
externalities associated to the technology of repression.




















[wi − tx]du − R(x)









Note that this expected utility is based on θi, the average proportion of crim-
inals of type i = B,W.
Let us deﬁne the land market equilibrium with two types of workers, blacks
and whites. The land market is competitive so that all workers take land rents
in the city as given. Since all workers of type i a r ea s s u m e dt ob ei d e n t i c a l ,i t
must be that, in equilibrium, they all reach the same (expected) utility level
independent of location. If this were not true, then some individual could
increase his/her (expected) utility level by imitating the residential choice of
an identical individual with a higher (expected) utility. Thus, an incentive
to make a new decision would exist, and such a situation could not be an
equilibrium. As a result, in equilibrium, expected utility must be constant in
location. We call the common (expected) utility achieved by workers of type
i = B,W in equilibrium, the equilibrium (expected) utility and we denote it
by v∗
i.
We are now able to deﬁne the bid rent, a concept widely used in urban
economics (see e.g. Fujita, 1989). The bid rent indicates the maximum land
rent that a worker of type i located at a distance x from the BD is ready
to pay in order to achieve the equilibrium utility v∗
i.T h e r e a r e d i ﬀerent bid
rent functions that satisfy the requirement that the expected utility must be
constant in location, and which one we choose is obviously irrelevant for the
analysis. However, for each level of expected utility, we can compute what the
b i dr e n tm u s tb ef o ra ni n d i v i d u a lo ft y p ei residing at a distance x from the
9Another interpretation would be to think that the location choice is made by altruistic
parents of the current generation before they actually know about the individual crime
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where w(x,θi) and θ(x,θi) are respectively given by (1) and (4). By diﬀeren-








(β + t) < 0 (7)
∂2Ψi(x,v∗
i)













Inspection of (7) and (8) shows that the bid-rent function decreases and
is convex in x, the distance to the BD. Indeed, when individuals of type i
reside further away from the BD, bid rents have to be reduced in order for the
utility v∗
i to be the same (and thus constant across locations) since both the
proportion of criminals θ(x,θi) and the cost of being away from legal activities
increase with distance x. Further inspection shows that, at a given x,a n
increase in θi makes the bid-rent slope less negative (see (8)). This means that
low-θ workers (i.e. whites) have steeper bid-rent curves than high-θ workers
(i.e. blacks). The intuitive reason is that an extra mile of commuting increases
the crime rate more for whites (low-θ group) than for blacks (high-θ group).
Therefore, a low-θ worker requires a larger decline in land rent than a high-θ
worker to maintain a given utility level.
What is crucial here is that workers of diﬀerent types i = B,W will locate
in diﬀerent locations because of diﬀerent θi. In other words, if all workers
(including blacks) believe that θB > θW, then blacks will reside further away
from jobs because they (rationally) anticipate that their capacity to bid for land
is lower than that of whites. This is the positive group externality described


















Now, we know from (4) that θ(x,θi)=e u(x,θi). Thus, using the value of e u(x,θi) in (3), the
two last terms of the RHS of
∂Ψi(x,v∗
i )
∂x cancel out and we obtain (7).
12above in which higher θ implies lower wages. As a result, the location decision
is only based on wages (via θ)s ot h a trelatively poorer individuals, who are
m o r el i k e l yt ob en o n - w h i t ea n dc r i m i n a l s ,a r em o r el i k e l yt ol i v ei nr e l a t i v e l y
poorer neighborhoods located far away from jobs.
3 The market equilibrium
We are now able to give a precise deﬁnition of the market equilibrium (that
takes into account labor, crime and land markets) with rational expectations.
In fact, depending on whether beliefs matter or not, two types of equilibria
prevail. In the ﬁrst one, the non-discriminating market equilibrium, there is no
discrimination between blacks and whites. In the second one, the discriminat-
ing market equilibrium, white workers are perceived by all agents (including
blacks) as less criminal than blacks for no economic reasons or intrinsic char-
acteristics (since whites are not more productive than blacks) but because of
beliefs. In other words, pure exogenous reasons (i.e. that are not related to
the fundamentals of the economy) aﬀect the behavior of all agents who behave
like their beliefs and thus ‘prophecies’ become self-fulﬁlling.
3.1 Deﬁnitions of market equilibria
A market equilibrium requires solving the land market equilibrium, the labor
market equilibrium and the crime market equilibrium. Since the ﬁrst equilib-
rium is more complex to deﬁne, let us explain in more details the way it is
derived. We will then give the deﬁnition of a market equilibrium.
Let us start with the land market equilibrium with discrimination in which
blacks and whites are treated diﬀerently. We have: θB 6= θW, which implies
that wB 6= wW and thus ΨB(x,v∗
B) 6= ΨW(x,v∗
W),w h e r eΨi(x,v∗
i), i = B,W is
deﬁned by (6).
We assume that the land that is not occupied for residential use is used
for agriculture and there is no vacant land in the city. Then, by denoting by
RA the agricultural land rent, by ni(x) the distribution of workers of type i
at distance x,t h a ti s ,t h em a s so fw o r k e r so ft y p ei between distance x and
x + dx is ni(x)dx,a n db yL(x) the land distribution in the city, that is, the
amount of land available for housing between distance x and x+dx is L(x)dx,
we have the following deﬁnition (Fujita, 1989):
13Deﬁnition 1 A land market equilibrium with discrimination consists of a pair
of utility levels v∗
i, i = B,W,a n dal a n dr e n tc u r v eR(x) such that, at each
x ∈ [0,+∞):









i) if ni(x) > 0,
(iii) nB(x)+nW(x)=L(x) if R(x) >R A.
Condition (i) means that the market rent curve R(x) is the upper envelope
of the equilibrium bid rent curves Ψi(x,v∗
i) of all worker types (i = B,W)
and the agricultural rent line RA. This ensures that no type i individual can
achieve a utility level higher than v∗
i, i = B,W, and no farmers can make
positive proﬁt. Condition (ii) ensures that if some workers of type i reside
at distance x, they actually achieve the equilibrium utility v∗
i. Condition (iii)
means that if the land rent at x exceeds the agricultural land rent, all land
there must be used for housing. Conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) together imply
that whenever the equilibrium land rent exceeds the agricultural land, the land
is used by the workers with the highest equilibrium bid rent. In other words,
these conditions guarantee that each location is occupied by a highest-bidding
activity.
The following remarks are in order. First, since we assume that all workers
(whatever their type) consume one unit of land and the size of each population
of workers (black or white) is equal to 1, then the city fringe is always equal to
2. Second, we did not write the market clearing condition for land since it is
always satisﬁed by assumption. Indeed, since we assume that, at each location,
there is one unit of land available, and since each worker consumes one unit of
land, then at each x ∈ [0,2], the total demand for land is always equal to the
amount of land existing there. Third, the population constraints that ensure
that every worker resides somewhere in the city are also always satisﬁed since
housing consumption has been normalized to 1. Fourth, since the city is linear
and each population’s size has been normalized to 1, nB(x), nW(x) and L(x)
have constant values. Finally, because bid rents are well behaved (essentially
Ψi(x,vi) is continuous and decreasing in both x and vi; see Fujita,1989), in
equilibrium the market rent curve R(x) is continuously decreasing up to the
city fringe 2.
Deﬁnition 1 is quite general and allows for many equilibria with all sorts
of possible group diﬀerentials. In this paper, we focus on equilibria where (a)
14the land rent paid by the more criminal group is equal at the boundary to zero
and (b) the land rent paid by the two groups is the same at distance 1 from
the BD. Assumption (a) and the fact that all individuals in group i = B,W
r e c e i v et h es a m eu t i l i t yv∗
i pin down the land rent paid by the more criminal
group everywhere else while assumption (b) pins down the rent paid by the
less criminal group.
We are now able to write the deﬁnition of the discriminating market equi-
librium. We have:
Deﬁnition 2 A Discriminating Market Equilibrium (DME) with rational ex-
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where θ(x,θi) is deﬁned by (4).
Equations (10) and (11) reﬂect equilibrium conditions in the land market
(see Figure 1). Equation (10) says that, in the land market, there is racial
discrimination so that at the frontier x =1 , the bid rent oﬀered by individuals
of type W is equal to the bid rent oﬀered by individuals of type B.E q u a t i o n
(11) in turn says that the bid rent of a black worker must be equal to zero at
the city fringe. Equation (12) deﬁnes the equilibrium land rent as the upper
envelope of the equilibrium bid rent curves of all workers’ types and the agri-
cultural rent line. Equations (13) and (14) reﬂect the fact the discriminating
equilibrium should be self fulﬁlling in the sense that the expected crime rate
15perceived by all agents for someone of type i = B,W has to be equal to the
average spatial crime rate in the city of individuals of that group i = B,W.
Finally, the last two equations (15) and (16) deﬁne the wages of blacks and
whites respectively (labor market equilibrium).
Let us now deﬁne the non-discriminating market equilibrium in which
blacks and whites are totally identical in the eyes of everybody so that θB =
θW = θ
∗
, which implies that wB = wW = w(x,θ
∗
) and thus ΨB(x,v∗
B)=
ΨW(x,v∗
W) ≡ Ψ(x,v∗) (blacks and whites reach the same equilibrium utility
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It is easy to see that Ψ(x,v∗) is continuous and decreasing in both x and v.W e
focus on equilibria where the land rent paid by the worker living at the bound-
ary is equal to zero. By using the same arguments as for the discriminating
equilibrium, we have:
Deﬁnition 3 A Non Discriminating Market Equilibrium (NDME) with ratio-
nal expectations (Figure 2) is a 4-tuple (v∗,R(x),θ
∗





Ψ(x,v∗) for x ≤ 2






















where θ(x,θ)i sd e ﬁned by (4).
In the non-discriminating market equilibrium, there is no discrimination
between individuals of type i ∈ {B,W} and all markets (labor, crime and land
markets) interact with each other. Equation (17) says that in the land market,
t h er e n tp a i da tt h el i m i to ft h ec i t yo fs i z e2 h a st ob ee q u a lt ot h eo u t s i d er e n t
normalized to 0 (see Figure 2). Equation (18) deﬁnes the equilibrium land rent
as the upper envelope of the equilibrium bid rent curves and the agricultural
rent line. Equation (19) says that, under rational expectations, the expected
16crime rate perceived by all agents has to be the average spatial crime rate in
the city. Finally, the last equation (20) deﬁnes the non-discriminatory wage.
From equations (17) and (19), one obtains the equilibrium level of indirect
utility v∗ of urban dwellers and the equilibrium average crime θ
∗
as a function
of the diﬀerent exogenous parameters (α, Π, P, t, y, m). Indeed, from (17)





































y + α(β + t) (22)
Now, by plugging (22) into (20), we determine the equilibrium wage rate. By
using this value, we then easily obtain v∗, θ
∗
and the land rent equilibrium R(x)
(using (6) evaluated at v∗). Observe that the exact location of black and white
workers is indeterminate since all individuals obtain the same utility level v∗
whatever x. Observe also that crime and land rents are spatially diﬀerenti-
ated according to the functions θ(x,θ
∗
) and Ψ(x,v∗) but are not diﬀerentiated
according to race.
On the other hand, a discriminating market equilibrium is when there is
discrimination in the labor, crime and land markets, based on the characteristic
i ∈ {B,W}. Thus, according to (9), blacks reside far away from jobs and
whites at the vicinity of the business district since blacks are more criminal
than whites and thus less attracted to the center. Once again, what matters
here is the distance to jobs.
Thus, in the discriminating market equilibrium, from (10) and (11) and by
using the fact that: e u(x,θ
∗
i)=( Π − αP − αw(x,θ
∗












































































Now, by plugging (25) and (26) into (15) and (16), we determine the equi-







W and the land rent equilibrium R(x) (using (6)).
In our model, the wage diﬀerence between blacks and whites is one of
the key elements that explains higher crime rate among blacks. Indeed, this
diﬀerence implies that blacks and whites segregate themselves in such a way
that blacks are far away from jobs. This, in turn, increases even more the
wage gap between blacks and whites since wages are location dependent. As a
result, blacks who have less opportunities than whites become more criminals.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
3.2 Existence and uniqueness of market equilibria
We would like to see ﬁrst if the non-discriminating market equilibrium and the
discriminating market equilibrium exist and are unique. We have:11,12
Proposition 1 Assume H1 holds. Then, (i) there exists a unique Non Dis-
criminating Market Equilibrium, and (ii) a unique Discriminating Market
Equilibrium.
We have the following comments. First, Proposition 1 tells us that under
the reasonable assumption that crime rates are always interior solutions in
the urban area, there exists multiple equilibria in terms of crime, location and
labor markets. There are in fact two types of equilibria: the non discriminating
one in which the characteristic i = B,W is irrelevant to the nature of the
equilibrium and the discriminating equilibrium in which, on the contrary, the
characteristic of being black or white plays a fundamental role in the pattern
11All proofs of propositions are given in the Appendix.
12Assumption H1 is a suﬃcient condition that guarantees that the function Θ(θ) deﬁned
in the Appendix crosses the horizontal axis only once and thus each market equilibrium
(whether it is discriminating or not) is unique. If this assumption is not satisﬁed, then the
function Θ(θ) may cross the horizontal axis more than once and, as a result, other market
equilibria of each type (discriminating and not discriminating) may emerge. However, some
of these equilibria (whether it is discriminating or not) are such that workers of at least
one group are all criminals (i.e. corner solution). Since we want to avoid corner solutions,
assumption H1 is made to guarantee only interior solutions.
18of allocation of resources. The discrimination showed by this last equilibrium
is rationally self-fulﬁlling. Because everybody expects individuals of type i to
act diﬀerently from individuals of type j 6= i in terms of crime, working and
location choices, they actually behave diﬀerently and the initial expectations
are conﬁrmed ex post.
Second, it is worth emphasizing that an important aspect of the analysis is
the fact that the discrimination process is reinforced through the interplay of
the three channels: labor, crime and housing and each market reinforces and
magniﬁes the other. This is true for both equilibria but it is even more impor-
tant in the discriminating market equilibrium. Indeed, the labor market aﬀects
both crime and housing through wages since when wages are higher, crime is
reduced and individuals tend to reside closer to the business district. Crime
aﬀects wages through productivity (the higher the proportion of criminals of
a given group, the lower the group productivity and thus wages) and location
through mainly group externalities (when the proportion of criminals of type i
is high, individuals tend to be more criminals and thus to locate further away
to the business district). Location aﬀects crime through productivity (longer
commutes imply lower eﬀort) and commuting costs but aﬀects only indirectly
the labor market through crime.
Finally, it is important to point out that the timing of the model (i.e.
t h ef a c tl o c a t i o ni sc h o s e nb e f o r et h et y p ei sk n o w n )i sn o tc r u c i a lt oo b t a i n
these results but greatly simplify the analysis. Indeed, if we had assumed that
location, crime and labor choices were simultaneous, then, in the discriminating
equilibrium, we would have had to deal with a continuum of bid rents (since
each type u would then have a diﬀerent bid rent) instead of two bid rents
(black and white). Even though it would have been quite tedious, this type
of problem can easily be solved. However, because of racial beliefs shared by
everybody, we would have still obtained the fact that, on average, blacks would
have been more criminal than whites and locate farther away from jobs.
3.3 The role of location in crime decision
The existence of the Discriminating Market Equilibrium is strongly associated
with the spatial nature of ‘access’ to legal activities. To check that, consider
the extreme case in which space does not matter (i.e. β+t =0or x =0 ). Then
the critical value of crime aversion, e u(x,θi),d o e sn o td e p e n do nt h el o c a t i o n
19choice, x, anymore and is given by:13












where F(·) is a c.d.f. An equilibrium is when these two equations are simulta-
neously satisﬁed.
In this paper, we impose a special functional form on F(·) by assuming a
uniform distribution of u on the interval [0,1] so that (28) can be written as:
θi = e u(θi) (29)
It is then easy to see that, for this special functional form of F(·) (uniform







(see Figure 3a)14 and, therefore, there cannot exist





The only equilibrium is trivially non discriminating with the same crime rate
θ
∗
and the same equilibrium wage w∗ for all workers.
In fact, introducing location introduces another dimension since e u does not
only depend on θi but also on x. If one compares Figure 3a (uniform distribu-
tion without space) with Figures 4a and 4b (uniform distribution with space,
in which e u(θi) is integrated over x), it is easy to see that space by separating
black and white workers creates an additional curve and, as a result, allows
another equilibrium to emerge, namely the discriminating market equilibrium.
It is also easy to see that the spatial curve(s) is (are) in fact an upward shift of
the non-spatial curve. Indeed, in the non-discriminating market equilibrium
(Figure 4a), the non-spatial curve (i.e. e u(θ) w i t h o u ts p a c e )i ss h i f t e du p w a r d
by a constant equal to α+β whereas in the discriminating market equilibrium
(Figure 4b), it is shifted upward by (α + β)/2 for whites and by 3(α + β)/2
for blacks. Assumption H1 guarantees that such this upward shift is not too
high so that solutions are only interior.15
13It is easy to verify that e u(θi) is an increasing and convex function.
14In this paper, we only focus on interior solutions for crime rate. This is guaranteed by
assumption H1,w h i c h ,i np a r t i c u l a r ,i m p o s e st h a tΠ − αP − αm<1.
15When this shift is too high, i.e. β +t is very large, then H1 does not hold anymore and
other equilibria in which workers of at least one group are all criminals may emerge.
20The economic intuition of this result runs as follows. If all workers believe
that θB > θW, then this generates a wage diﬀerence wW −wB > 0. When space
does not matter (all workers reside in the same location), the wage diﬀerence
is not large enough to sustain the initial beliefs on crime rates and we end







. However, when space and location are taken into account, beliefs can
be sustained in equilibrium because space, by segregating blacks and whites,
creates a second eﬀect of discrimination (spatial discrimination) that ampliﬁes
the ﬁrst one (labor discrimination) so that the wage gap between blacks and
whites is large enough to allow θB > θW to be true in equilibrium. This
remark is also true if there were no labor discrimination (even with space)
since negative beliefs could not be enforced in equilibrium. The mechanism is
however diﬀerent since, in that case, no wage discrimination implies no spatial
segregation between blacks and whites. It should thus be clear that both labor
discrimination and distant locations are crucial to understand why, in this
model, blacks are more criminal than whites.
It should also be clear that our uniform assumption about u (crime produc-
tivity) is crucial to highlight the role of location in our model. Indeed, because
of this assumption, it is only space (through the distance to jobs) that can
generate multiple equilibria. If instead, we had assumed a general c.d.f. F(·),
then multiple equilibria could have been generated without space. Indeed, if
we now simultaneously solve (27) and (28), then, as shown in Figure 3b, one
can actually generically obtain as many equilibria as one wants.
This is one of the crucial features of this paper. By assuming a uniform
distribution, we highlight the role of location in crime decision and we show
how location aﬀect discrimination.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 here]
Finally, one could argue that, since employers know where workers live, an
alternative of our spatial discrimination (in which w = w(x,θ),w i t h∂w/∂x<
0 and ∂w/∂θ < 0)w o u l db et h a tﬁrms condition wages on location, i.e.
w = w(θ(x)),w i t h∂w/∂x =( ∂w/∂θ)(∂θ/∂x) < 0. Let us show that, with
a uniform distribution of u, a discriminating market equilibrium cannot be
sustained. Beliefs imply that, at each x, θB(x) > θW(x),w h i c hl e a d st o
wB(x) <w W(x). However, because a worker is now deﬁned by his/her lo-
cation and not by his/her type (like in our model), a segregated equilibrium
in which blacks and whites are separated (this is the crucial element to sus-
21tain negative beliefs in equilibrium) can never exist. Indeed, if a black worker
resides further away from jobs, he/she will always be able to move closer to
jobs (steeper bid rents) because changing location changes also the way he/she
is perceived by the others and thus allows him/her to obtain the same wage
as a white residing in the same location. In our model, this feature is not
possible because a black worker living further away from jobs cannot move
closer to jobs. The reason is that he/she will still be evaluated with respect
to θB and not with respect to his/her location x. Another alternative is to
have a double redlining, i.e. w = w(x,θ(x)). By using the same argument, it
is easy to see that multiple equilibria cannot be generated because the only
urban equilibrium conﬁguration will be a mixed one.
To summarize, our message is as follows. Suppose the primitives of the
economy are such that our model possesses a unique equilibrium. One suﬃcient
condition is that the distribution over disutility of crime is uniform. Then,
without space, the present model cannot display discrimination, but if location
decision is introduced so that distance to jobs is positive for every worker, then
in addition to the unique symmetric equilibrium there is also an equilibrium
where one group (black workers) engages more crime, locates further away
from the business district, and, being on average less productive, receives lower
wages which fulﬁlls the location and crime decisions. The present paper focuses
on the model with uniform distribution of disutility for crime precisely to
illustrate the crucial aspect of location. This aspect is related to models like the
one of Coate and Loury (1993), which with enough linearity, obtain a unique
symmetric equilibrium and thus cannot generate discrimination. Two other
papers (Moro and Norman, 2002, and Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked, 2000)
have also shown that it is possible to write models displaying equilibria with
groups specializing in diﬀerent “sectors” even if there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium. The contribution here is to provide another example of such a
model that predicts other testable predictions (especially the links between
race, crime and location).
Since location is the central element of our model, let us now investigate
the empirical results on the links between race, crime and location. Using
206 census tracts in city of Atlanta and Dekalb county and a state-of-the-
art job accessibility measure, Ihlanfeldt (2001, 2002) demonstrates that mod-
est improvements in the job accessibility of male youth, in particular blacks,
cause marked reductions in crime, especially within category of drug-abuse
violations. Indeed, the elasticity of the neighborhood density of drug crime
22with respect to the number of jobs held by 16-24 year old males without col-
lege degrees is 0.361 within the average high crime neighborhood. Since the
average high-crime neighborhood contains 200 jobs that are held by young,
less-educated males, an elasticity of 0.361 implies that 20 additional jobs will
decrease the neighborhood’s density of drug crime by 3.61%. Ihlanfeldt (2001,
2002) also shows that inter-neighborhood diﬀerences in job accessibility play
an important role in explaining the higher crime found in poor neighborhoods.
For example, 21 percent of the diﬀerence in neighborhood density of drug crime
between poor and non-poor neighborhoods can be attributed to the inferior
accessibility found within poor neighborhood.
Finally, introducing space could yield interesting policy implications. In-
deed, in our model, a transportation policy is easy to trace. For example,
subsidizing the commuting cost t of blacks will facilitate their access to legal
activities and thus reduce their crime rate. In fact, in our model, this policy
acts through two channels. It aﬀects the slope of the bid rent of blacks (see
(7)) and thus their location. It also aﬀects the decision of being criminal since
e u(x,θi) and thus θ(x,θi) are positively related to t (see (5)). Therefore, if t is
only reduced for blacks, then in the DME, blacks become less criminals com-
pared to the case when their commuting cost is higher. There is an indirect
eﬀect through location since an important reduction in t can make them resid-
ing closer to legal activities and thus be less criminals. There is also a direct
eﬀect in which, even if blacks are far away from legal activities, they become
less criminals because the opportunity cost to commit crime is reduced.
4 Comparisons and welfare implications
It is now useful to compare the allocation outcomes in the non-discriminating
market equilibrium and the discriminating market equilibrium.
Proposition 2 When they are discriminated against,
(i) blacks are on average more criminal and earn lower wages than when
they are not discriminated;








B <w ∗ <w ∗
W.
(iii) blacks live further away from legal activities than whites and pay lower
land rents.
23Furthermore, the average urban crime rate in the discriminating market
equilibrium is always larger than the average crime rate in the non-discriminating







The following comments are in order. First, this result is consistent with
the spatial mismatch hypothesis (Kain, 1968) in which the increasing distance
between the location of ghettos and jobs has a dramatic impact on wages,
unemployment and crime. Empirical tests of this hypothesis suggest that bad
job access indeed worsens labor-market outcomes, conﬁrming the spatial mis-
match hypothesis. Our model provides an additional link between crime and
job accessibility since, in the Discrimination Market Equilibrium, blacks who
live further away are on average more criminal than whites because they have
less labor market opportunities. This result is on average since the disutility to
commit crime u is uniformly distributed among workers so that a black worker
with a very high u is less likely to become criminal than a white with a very
low u, even though if the former lives in a poor black neighborhood and the
latter in a rich white neighborhood.
Second, in the discriminating market equilibrium, blacks pay lower land
rents than whites because their ability to pay is lower. Indeed, since they are
on average more criminal than whites, they are ready to locate further away
from legal activities where land is cheaper.16
Third, comparing the two diﬀerent equilibria, it is clear that when every-
body thinks that blacks are more criminals than whites, they become more
criminals and therefore earn lower wage (because of lower productivity) com-
pared to the non-discriminating market equilibrium, in which all agents believe







B.I ti se a s yt os e ef r o mt h i sﬁgure that distant locations
from legal activities imply more crime but, when discrimination prevails, crime
rates diverge between blacks and whites. Note that in the discriminating mar-
ket equilibrium, the urban crime rate is larger than in the non-discriminating
market equilibrium. The increase in the average crime rate of black individuals
more than compensates the reduction of the whites’ crime rate.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
The following proposition provides some welfare comparisons between the
non-discriminating market equilibrium and the discriminating market equilib-
16This result is in fact well documented empirically. For example, Thaler (1978) and Gray
and Joelson (1979) ﬁnd that housing prices are negatively related to crime rates.
24rium.
Proposition 3 When there is enough wage or crime discrimination (i.e. y
suﬃciently large so that w∗
W − w∗
B > α(β + t)), then: v∗
B <v ∗ <v ∗
W.
Not surprisingly, Proposition 3 shows that the discriminated black work-
ers are worse oﬀ in the discriminating market equilibrium than in the non-
discriminating market equilibrium. More interestingly, it also shows that
whenever discrimination is large enough, white workers are better oﬀ in the
discriminating market equilibrium. Indeed, in the discriminating market equi-
librium, the wage rate of blacks is reduced compared to the one in the non-
discriminating market equilibrium whereas it is increased for whites (this is
referred to as the direct wage eﬀect). This implies that the capacity of bidding
for land rents (the level of bid rents) decreases for blacks whereas it increases
for whites (this is referred to as the bid rent capacity eﬀect). However, in
the discriminating market equilibrium, whites have to bid away blacks at the
outskirts of the city so that the competition in the land market is ﬁercer than
in the non-discriminating market equilibrium. The overall eﬀect is in favor
of whites since both the direct wage eﬀect and bid rent capacity eﬀect are
strong enough to outweigh the increased competition in the land market. This
shows that we cannot Pareto rank the two types of equilibria since whites pre-
fer when blacks are discriminated against whereas obviously blacks prefer the
other equilibrium. In a model where employers cannot observe qualiﬁcations
but only a signal, Moro and Norman (2002) ﬁnd a similar result since they
show that blacks and whites are treated diﬀerently in equilibrium due to in-
formational externalities and that whites beneﬁt from discrimination because
it solves the information problem.
5C o m p a r a t i v e s t a t i c s
Diﬀerentiation of the equilibrium equations related to the non-discriminating
market equilibrium and the discriminating market equilibrium provides useful
comparative statics on crime, wages and welfare. Let us focus on the most
interesting results. The following comparative statics analysis illustrates how
the three markets (land, labor and crime) reinforce each other and give rise to
a magniﬁcation eﬀect of the exogenous variables on the equilibrium crime rate
and the equilibrium wage rate. We have indeed:17
17The proof of Proposition 4 is given in Verdier and Zenou (2000) or is available upon
request.
25Proposition 4 In any equilibrium,
• when the booty Π or the spatial access cost t rises, the resulting increase
in the equilibrium crime and wage rates for each type of worker is larger
than the direct increase in crime and wage rates, holding constant the
average crime rate of that type of individual.
• when the penalty P or the productivity parameters m or y rises, the
resulting decrease in the equilibrium crime and wage rates for each type
of worker is lower than the direct decrease in crime and wage rates,
h o l d i n gc o n s t a n tt h ea v e r a g ec r i m er a t eo ft h a tt y p eo fi n d i v i d u a l .
• the eﬀect of the probability detection α is ambiguous.
Proposition 4 shows that discrimination in crime and wages is reinforced by
the interactions of the three markets (crime, labor and land), and the complete
eﬀect (positive or negative) of a generic variable on the equilibrium crime
rate and the equilibrium wage rate is always larger than the direct impact
of this same variable. Consider for instance the case when Π increases. At
any x, individuals become more criminals. This is therefore a direct eﬀect
based on reward and captured by the increase of the equilibrium crime rate
holding constant the average crime rate of one type of individuals. Now, this
direct eﬀe c to nt h ec r i m em a r k e tw i l la l s oa ﬀect both labor and land markets.
Indeed, in the labor market, employers reduce wages because they perceive
these workers as more criminals and in the land market, the level of land
rent decrease because workers anticipate their wage reduction. Because of
these two eﬀects (lower wages and lower land rents), workers are even more
criminals and the average crime rate increases. This intuition runs for all the
results in Proposition 4. It is thus because we have considered the complete
interactions of these three markets and because workers rationally anticipate
these interactions that we obtain these magniﬁcation results.
The magniﬁcation eﬀects have interesting policy implications. They sug-
gest that one should take into account the full interactions of the three markets
(labor, crime and land) in order to understand fully the impact of a policy
instrument. Indeed, any policy that only focuses on one market will systemat-
ically underestimate the full impact on crime rates, housing and wages. Sim-
ilarly, a change in one instrument directly aﬀe c t i n go n em a r k e tw i l la l s oh a v e
implications for variables directly related to another market, feeding back, in
turn, to the ﬁrst market. For instance, an increase in penalty rates P has a
26direct impact on crime rates but also indirect eﬀects on wages and land rents.
This, in turn, will feed back on the crime market, amplifying the initial impact
on crime rates. Similarly, a policy change in the cost t, which is in fact related
to the spatial degree of “access” to legal activities, has not only eﬀects on the
land rent but also on crime and wage rates. This, in turn, will feed back on
the land market. We believe that these results should be taken into account
when transportation and urban space related policies are implemented.
Finally, in the discriminating market equilibrium, we can also have the
following interesting comparative statics on the extent of discrimination in
crime and wages:18
Proposition 5





with Π and t and decreases with P and m.
• The diﬀerence in wages between blacks and whites w∗
W − w∗
B increases
with Π and t and decreases with P and m.
Consequently, our analysis predicts that greater crime opportunities Π and
lower penalty rates P should be associated with larger inequalities between
blacks and whites with respect to crime rates and wages. Similarly, when
space matters more (i.e. larger “transportation” cost t), crime and wage rates
between blacks and whites will increasingly diverge. Finally crime rates and
wages inequalities between blacks and whites should be countercyclical with
economic activity (as captured by the productivity parameter m). In other
words, our model predicts that, in booms, one should observe less diﬀerences
in crime rates and less inequality between blacks and whites compared to
slumps where these diﬀerences should be ampliﬁed.
The general message of these results is that, through all these channels
and across urban areas, wages inequality between blacks and whites should be
positively associated to the diﬀerences in crime rates. Using a search-matching
model, Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003) ﬁnd similar results by showing the
positive impact of inequality on crime.19
18The proof of Proposition 5 is given in Verdier and Zenou (2000) or is available upon
request.
19Several empirical studies conﬁrm this result. For example, Grogger (1998) ﬁnds that
wage diﬀerentials explain a substantial component of the racial diﬀerential in crime par-
ticipation. More precisely, he found that 6 percentage points of the 13.7 percentage point
diﬀerential in crime participation rates is attributable to diﬀerences in wages between blacks
and whites.
276C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have emphasized the importance of the interaction between
labor, crime and land markets in explaining the high crime rates among blacks
who live in ghettos. If, even though the group exogenous characteristics are
identical, everybody (including blacks) believes that blacks are more criminals
than whites, then all agents will behave accordingly and blacks would be on
a v e r a g em o r ec r i m i n a l st h a nw h i t e s . I nt h el a b o rm a r k e t ,t h i si m p l i e st h a t
blacks are less productive and thus earn lower wages than whites because
crime hurts workers’ productivity. In the land market, this implies that blacks
reside in ghettos located far away from legal activities. Now, because blacks
earn lower wages and live in ghettos, they are more induced to commit crimes
and are indeed more criminals than whites. There is thus a vicious circle in
which blacks cannot escape because both location and race reinforce each other
to imply high crime rates among blacks living in cities.
A simple way of extending this paper would be to introduce a dynamic
overlapping generation model. In this context, it would only suﬃce that, in
the ﬁrst period, everybody believes that blacks are more criminals than whites,
then, even with no prejudices in all other periods, blacks would be stuck in
bad locations, earn lower wages and therefore be more criminals. This would
suggest therefore that history matters to explain the high crime rates among
blacks.
Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Non Discriminating Equilibrium


















y + α(β + t)=θ
∗
Let the following function Θ(θ) be:





y + α(β + t) − θ
28It is easy to verify that Θ(θ) is a strictly convex and smooth function.
Under assumption H1, Θ(0) = Π − αP − αm − αy + α(β + t) > 0 and
Θ(1) = Π − αP − αm + α(β + t) − 1 < 0.T h e r e f o r e ,b yc o n t i n u i t yo fΘ(θ),
there exists a non discriminating equilibrium crime rate θ
∗
∈ (0,1) such that
Θ(θ
∗
)=0 . Let us show by contradiction that it is unique. Consider θ0 the
smallest value of θ such that Θ(θ0)=0 . Consider that there exists another
value θ1 ∈]θ0,1[ such that Θ(θ1)=0and take the smallest value of such a θ1.
The smoothness of Θ(θ) obviously implies that Θ0(θ0) < 0 and Θ0(θ1) > 0.
The convexity of Θ(θ) in turn implies that
Θ(1) > Θ(θ1)+Θ
0(θ1)[1 − θ1]=θ1 + Θ
0(θ1)[1 − θ1] > 0
which contradicts the fact that Θ(1) < 0.A sar e s u l t ,t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u ea
non discriminating equilibrium crime rate θ
∗




















which are equivalent to:































Let the following function ΘW(θ) and ΘB(θ) be:



















Because of assumption H1, ΘW(0) = Π−αP −αm−αy +α(β +t)/2 > 0
and ΘW(1) = Π−αP −αm+α(β+t)/2−1 < 0. Similarly ΘB(0) = Π−αP −
αm−αy+3α(β +t)/2 > 0 and ΘB(1) = Π−αP −αm+3α(β +t)/2−1 < 0.


























Hence, the ﬁrst result (i) that compares the average equilibrium crime rates
in the NDME and the DME follows. The second result (ii) comparing the
equilibrium wages follows immediately from the fact that wages for a particular







B implies that w∗
B <w ∗ <w ∗
W. The third result (iii)














































































30A.3. P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3. Consider the function Ω(X)=X2
2 − X
α,w h e r e
X ∈ [0,1]. Then clearly this function is convex, decreasing in X.U s i n g( 2 1 ) ,











































B, then e u(2,θ
∗
) < e u(2,θ
∗
B) and v∗ >v ∗
B.T h i s

















































































Observing now that e u(2,θ
∗




















































,t h e ne u(2,θ
∗





)) < Ω(e u(2,θ
∗













































































B > α(β + t)




[1] Acemoglu, D., “Public Policy in a Model of Long-Term Unemployed,”
Economica 62 (1995), 161-178.
[2] Arnold, G. B., “Employee Theft: A $40-Billion Crime,” Management
World 14 (1985), 27-43.
[3] Becker, G., “Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach,” Journal
of Political Economy 76 (1968), 169-217.
[4] Bearse, P.M., “Community, Youth Crime and Deterrence: A Quantitative
Theoric Analysis,” mimeo, University of North Carolina at Greensboro,
1996.
[5] Burdett, K., Lagos, R. and R. Wright, “Crime, Inequality, and Unem-
ployment,” American Economic Review, (2003), forthcoming.
[6] Case, A.C. and L.F. Katz, “The Company You Keep: The Eﬀects of
Family and Neighborhood on Disadvantaged Youths,” NBER Working
Paper No. 3705, 1991.
[7] Coate, S. and G.C. Loury, “Will Aﬃrmative-Action Policies Eliminate
Negative Stereotypes?,” American Economic Review 83 (1993), 1220-
1240.
[8] Dickens, W., Katz, L., Lang, K. and L. Summers, “Employee Crime and
the Monitoring Puzzle,” Journal of Labor Economics 7 (1989), 331-347.
[9] Fagan, J. and R.B. Freeman, “Crime, Work and Unemployment,” mimeo,
Harvard University, 1997.
[10] Farmer, A. and D. Terrell, “Discrimination, Bayesian Updating of Em-
ployers Beliefs, and Human Capital Accumulation,” Economic Inquiry 34
(1996), 204-219.
[11] Freeman, R.B., “Crime and the Job market,” NBER Working Paper No.
4910, 1994.
[12] Freeman, R.B., “The Economics of Crime,” in O. Ashenfelter and D.
Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics (Amsterdam: North Holland,
1999), 3529-3571.
32[13] Fujita, M., Urban Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989).
[14] Glaeser, E.L. Sacerdote, B. and J. Scheinkman, “Crime and Social inter-
actions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996), 508-548.
[15] Gray, C.M. and M. Joelson, “Neighborhood Crime and the Demand for
Central City Housing,” in C.M. Gray, ed., The Costs of Crime (Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, 1979).
[16] Grogger, J., “Market Wages and Youth Crime,” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 16 (1998), 756-791.
[17] Grogger, J. and M. Willis, “The Emergence of Crack Cocaine and the Rise
in Urban Crime Rates,” Review of Economics and Statistics 82 (2000),
519-529.
[18] Ihlanfeldt, K.R., “Job Accessibility and Inner City Crime,” mimeo,
Florida State University, 2001.
[19] Ihlanfeldt, K.R., “Spatial Mismatch in the Labor Market and Racial Dif-
ferences in Neighborhood Crime,” Economics Letters 76 (2002), 73-76.
[20] Kain, J.F., “Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan
Decentralization,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 82 (1968), 32-59.
[21] Lipman, M. and W.R. McGraw, “Employee Theft: A $40-Billion Indus-
try,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 498
(1988), 51-59.
[22] Mailath, G.J., Samuelson, L. and A. Shaked, “Endogenous Inequality in
Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search,” American Economic
Review 90 (2000), 46-72.
[23] Moro, A. and P. Norman, “A General Equilibrium Model of Statistical
Discrimination,” Journal of Economic Theory (2003).
[24] Moro, A. and P. Norman, “Aﬃrmative Action in a Competitive Econ-
omy,” Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003), 567-594.
[25] Muth, R.F., Cities and Housing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1969).
33[26] Piketty, T., “Self-Fulﬁlling Beliefs about Social Status,” Journal of Public
Economics 70 (1998), 115-132.
[27] Pugh, M., “Barriers to Work: the Spatial Divide Between Jobs and
Welfare Recipients in Metropolitan Areas,” Discussion Paper 8/98, The
Brookings Institution, Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, 1998.
[28] Rasmussen, E., “Stigma and Self-Fulﬁlling Expectations of Criminality,”
Journal of Law and Economics 39 (1996), 519-543.
[29] Sah, R., “Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime,” Journal of Political
Economy 99 (1991), 1272-1295.
[30] Shepard, I.M. and R. Duston, Thieves at Work: An Employer’s Guide to
Combating Employee Dishonesty (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National
Aﬀairs, 1988).
[31] South, S.J. and K.D. Crowder, “Residential Mobility Between Cities and
Suburbs: Race, Suburbanization, and Back-to-the-City Moves,” Demog-
raphy 34 (1997), 525-538.
[32] Thaler, R., “Note on the Value of Crime Control-Evidence from the Prop-
erty Market,” Journal of Urban Economics 5 (1978), 137-145.
[33] Verdier, T. and Y. Zenou, “Racial Beliefs, Location and the Causes of
Crime,” CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 2455, 2000.
[34] Zenou, Y., “The Spatial Aspects of Crime,” Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association 1 (2003), 459-467.
34